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The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs

Chen, Yi-Chun; Tillio, Alfredo Di; Faingold, Eduardo; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model -- the players’ hierarchies of …) in terms of beliefs. We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of … higher-order beliefs, including genericity of common priors, and the connections between robustness of strategic behavior and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593452

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593470

On the Performance of Least Squares in Linear Regression with Undefined Error Means

Andrews, Donald W.K. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1986

undefined means. This model is of interest from a robustness perspective as a polar case. Generally, least squares estimators … the results for robustness theory are discussed. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249278

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384

Robust Monopoly Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Schlag, Karl - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087390

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399