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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087360
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Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
learning and turnover among buyers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990828
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Wald Revisited: The Optimal Level of Experimentation
Moscarini, Giuseppe; Smith, Lones - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1998
This paper revisits Wald's (1947) sequential experimentation paradigm, now assuming that an impatient decision maker can run variable-size experiments each period at some increasing and strictly convex cost before finally choosing an irreversible action. We translate this natural discrete time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762616
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Collaborating
Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297
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Market Experimentation and Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product … externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the … and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954
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The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping
Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable, and arm's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196057
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Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996
The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873
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Communication and Learning
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160
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Experimentation in Markets
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593440
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Fiat Money and the Natural Scale of Government
Shubik, Martin; Smith, Eric - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
The competitive market structure of a decentralized economy is converted into a self-policing system treating the bureaucracy and enforcement of the legal system endogenously. In particular we consider money systems as constructs to make agents' economic strategies predictable from knowledge of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463905