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On the Performance of Least Squares in Linear Regression with Undefined Error Means
Andrews, Donald W.K. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1986
undefined means. This model is of interest from a robustness perspective as a polar case. Generally, least squares estimators … the results for robustness theory are discussed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249278
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384
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Robust Monopoly Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk; Schlag, Karl - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087390
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Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399
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Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria
Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003
This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755
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Robust Monopoly Pricing
Bergemann, Dirk; Schlag, Karl - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand will be in a neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the optimal pricing policy under two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093952
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Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322
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Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value envi­ronment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593452
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Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593470