Showing 1 - 10 of 16
A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087366
A voting with absenteeism game is defined as a pair (G;r) where G is an n-player (monotonic) simple game and r is an n-vector for which r_i is the probability that player i attends a vote. We define a power index for such games, called the absentee index. We axiomatize the absentee index and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087387
We consider the voting-with-absenteeism game of Quint-Shubik (2003). In that paper we defined a power index for such games, called the absentee index. Our analysis was based on the theory of the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI) for simple games. In this paper we do an analogous analysis, based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762592
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762688
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762743
A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479208
Several authors in the economics literature have referred to Kantian behavior, informally, as a kind of cooperation. We model this notion precisely, and define two kinds of Kantian allocation. An set of strategies by players is Kantian if, informally, no player would advocate that all players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463965
Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464037
In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders (N) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations in individual initial endowments. Computational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593218