We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount,...

This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, and the number of active firms is equal to that optimum number, then Bertrand...

In this article we develop a microeconomic framework to study the relationships among privatization, competition for deposits and performance in banking. Particularly, we analyze banking privatization when competitive strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types are allowed. Our findings show...

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount,...

In this article we develop a microeconomic framework to study the relationships among privatization, competition for deposits and performance in banking. Particularly, we analyze banking privatization when competitive strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types are allowed. Our findings show...

This paper is about a model of Bertrand competition in a homogeneous-good market with free entry of identical firms and variable returns to scale. If the optimum number of active firms in the market is two or more, and the number of active firms is equal to that optimum number, then Bertrand...