We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when...

We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network effects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network effects, our model generates four different market patterns: monopolization and market sharing which can be either monotone or alternating. A...

We analyze how consumer preferences for one-stop shopping a¤ect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One-stop shopping preferences create demand complementarities among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger...

We analyze how consumer preferences for one-stop shopping affect the bargaining relationship between a retailer and its suppliers. One-stop shopping preferences create "demand complementarities" among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger...