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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2012

-receiver game ; reciprocity ; experiments ; voluntary payment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515366

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706

Do reciprocators exploit or resist moral wiggle room? : an experimental analysis

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - 2015

experiment, a trust game variant, we study whether moral wiggle room also prevails, when reciprocity is a potential motivation … reciprocity. Among our subjects, 40% of the reciprocators exploited moral wiggle room. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446176

Reciprocity under moral wiggle room : is it a preference or a constraint?

Regner, Tobias - 2016

) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly higher rates of selfish choices in our treatments that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576929

Other-regarding behaviour : testing guilt- and reciprocity-based models

Regner, Tobias; Harth, Nicole S. - 2010

and reciprocity). In addition to incentivised elicitation of first- and second-order action beliefs, we assess … intentions-based models. Both second-order beliefs and the weighting factor that depends on a participant's sensitivity to guilt/reciprocity … returned. -- social preferences ; other-regarding behaviour ; experiments ; trust game ; guilt aversion ; beliefs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689019

What drives fraud in a credence goods market? : evidence from a field study

Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2015

This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm's incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm's financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the dataset...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507685

Motivational cherry picking

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - 2011

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230369

Motivational cherry picking

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627384

Collusion by algorithm : the role of unobserved actions

Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander - 2022

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990230

Private information, price discrimination, and collusion

Peiseler, Florian; Rasch, Alexander; Shekhar, Shiva - 2018

We analyze firms' ability to sustain collusion in a setting in which horizontally differentiated firms can price-discriminate based on private information regarding consumers' preferences. In particular, firms receive private signals which can be noisy (e.g., big data predictions). We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892956