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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706

Do reciprocators exploit or resist moral wiggle room? : an experimental analysis

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - 2015

experiment, a trust game variant, we study whether moral wiggle room also prevails, when reciprocity is a potential motivation … reciprocity. Among our subjects, 40% of the reciprocators exploited moral wiggle room. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446176

Reciprocity under moral wiggle room : is it a preference or a constraint?

Regner, Tobias - 2016

) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly higher rates of selfish choices in our treatments that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576929

Other-regarding behaviour : testing guilt- and reciprocity-based models

Regner, Tobias; Harth, Nicole S. - 2010

and reciprocity). In addition to incentivised elicitation of first- and second-order action beliefs, we assess … intentions-based models. Both second-order beliefs and the weighting factor that depends on a participant's sensitivity to guilt/reciprocity … returned. -- social preferences ; other-regarding behaviour ; experiments ; trust game ; guilt aversion ; beliefs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689019

Moral emotions and partnership

Bracht, Juergen; Regner, Tobias - 2011

-regarding behaviour ; experiments ; psychological game theory ; guilt aversion ; shame ; beliefs ; emotions ; partnership …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230371

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107