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We analyze the pricing behavior of firms when explicit partial cartels have formed in experimental markets through communication. Using a repeated, asymmetric capacity constraint price game, we show that, in line with theory, a partial cartel is sufficient to increase market prices for all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897162
; theories of affect predict the reverse. In field and lab experiments, we allow people to donate from lottery winnings, varying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346238
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929323
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011802796
We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204789
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107
When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstreamfirms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518962
foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141
experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844753