Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator...

Ist die zunehmende Mathematisierung dafür verantwortlich, dass ordnungspolitische Inhalte immer mehr aus dem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Curriculum verdrängt werden? Der vorliegende Beitrag verneint diese Frage. Er plädiert dafür, dass ordnungspolitisch orientierte Ökonomen und stärker...

This paper argues that the perspective of ordonomic—a rational-choice based analysis of (interdependencies between) social structure and semantics—can provide new insights into the changing role of business in society. We claim (a) that the proper role of business is societal value creation,...

Dieser Beitrag skizziert das ordonomische Forschungsprogramm einer ökonomischen Theorie der Moral und stellt die Grundzüge einer mit dieser Methode arbeitenden Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik vor: Die Ordonomik versteht sich als eine rationalchoice-basierte Analyse der Interdependenz von...

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences - inequality aversion - using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit...

Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma experiment. We compare three...

We conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect...

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...