Entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier which is commited to charge uniform prices to all downstream firms. The ownership shares imply a rebate on the input price for the incumbents through the profit participation. Such backward...

We show that competing downstream firms may rather invest in their inefficient inhouse production than help improve the technology of the efficient supplier, even if this is costless. Even worse, a downstream firm can have strong incentives to decrease the efficiency of the supplier in order to...

The established literature on partial vertical ownership has derived distinct pro- and anti-competitive effects, depending on whether the upstream or the downstream firm holds the shares (forward or backward). We show that forward ownership can have the same effects as backward ownership (and...

We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profit theory whereby an upstream monopolist cannot increase its profits through vertical integration as it has sufficient market power anyways. In our model the dominant supplier has full bargaining power and uses observable two-part tariffs. We...

We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may...

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in a setting with capacity constrained suppliers which can charge location based prices to different customers. The equilibrium prices weakly increase in the transport distance between supplier and customer, whereas the margins decrease. Despite prices...

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each...

This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the outcomes of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers who are closer to the competitor's plant....

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs to supply a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier...