We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when...

We analyze Bertrand duopoly competition in markets with network effects and consumer switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network effects, our model generates four different market patterns: monopolization and market sharing which can be either monotone or alternating. A...

We examine how competition in international markets affects a union's choice of wage regime which can be either uniform or discriminatory. Firms are heterogenous with regard to international competition. When unions choose their wage regimes sequentially, a discriminatory outcome becomes more...

We analyze the welfare effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly if the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. We derive conditions such that otherwise price-increasing mergers become externality-free by the use of remedial divestitures. In this...

We re-examine the common wisdom that cross-border mergers are the most effective merger strategy for firms facing powerful unions. In contrast, we obtain a domestic merger outcome whenever firms are sufficiently heterogeneous (in terms of productive efficiency and product differentiation). A...

We re-examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power. This argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms' profits and the uniform input price. Assuming different input efficiencies...

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for pro table and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant rm are most effective in this regard. Remedial...

We analyze the incentives to collude when brand manufacturers compete with a private label producer of inferior quality. Full collusion is easier to sustain than partial collusion from the brands.perspective when horizontal differentiation is large and vertical differentiation is small. The...

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing, when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index...

We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer-retailer trading relationship. O'Brien and Shaffer (Rand JE 35:573-598, 2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the...