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We analyze the pricing behavior of firms when explicit partial cartels have formed in experimental markets through communication. Using a repeated, asymmetric capacity constraint price game, we show that, in line with theory, a partial cartel is sufficient to increase market prices for all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897162
Consumer switching costs cause the market demand of consumers who already bought a supplier's product to be less elastic while they simultaneously increase competition for new consumers. I study the effect of this twofold pricing incentive on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892961
foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141
impede downstream collusion. The main driver of our finding is that a passive backward acquisition secures an acquirer from … zero continuation profits after a breakdown of collusion. This anti-collusive effect cannot be outweighed by a lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297609
the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments … less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a … distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259
This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442786
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844753
When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstreamfirms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518962
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724