We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a...

We analyze the current regulatory regime for electricity transmission in Germany, which combines network planning with both cost-plus and revenue-cap regulations. After reviewing international experiences on transmission investment, we first make a qualitative assessment of the overall German...

To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been...

A shift from zonal pricing to smaller zones and nodal pricing improves efficiency and security of system operation. Resulting price changes do however also shift profits and surplus between and across generation and load. As individual actorscan lose, they might oppose any reform. We explore how...

The European electricity system is undergoing significant changes, not only with respect to developments in generation and networks but also the arrangements for the operation of the system. These are specified in the Network Codes endorsed by regulators, network operators and the European...

The informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator's objective function into the firm's profit-maximizing objective. These mechanisms come in two forms, one based on subsidies/taxes,the other based on constraints/ price caps. In spite of a...

The management of congestion within the German electricity transmission network has become more important during the last years. This emerging relevance is caused by the increase of renewable generation and the partial phaseout of nuclear power plants. Both developments yield a change in the...

This research presents an application of the Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang (2010) (HRV) mechanism to promote electricity transmission network expansion in the Peruvian electricity transmission system known as SEIN (Sistema Eléctrico Interconectado Nacional). The HRV mechanism combines the...

This paper presents an application of a mechanism that provides incentives to promote transmission network expansion in the area of the US electric system known as PJM. The applied mechanism combines the merchant and regulatory approaches to attract investment into transmission grids. It is...

We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network....