Consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. Only atomic players are...

This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic...

Este trabajo utiliza la Ley de Newcomb-Benford y las pruebas de Beber y Scacco para analizar las elecciones presidenciales desde 1958 hasta el 2006, las presidenciales de 1922, las elecciones de Congreso en 2010, y las votaciones para Alcalde en Cali del 2007. Este es el primer estudio y...

We show that even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies aggregate demand and individual demands everywhere in their domains. Moreover, under partial observation of the equilibrium manifold, we we construct maximal domains of identification. For this, we assume conditions...

Aloisio Araujo and Alvaro Sandroni have shown in [1] that in a complete-markets economy in which there are no exogenous bounds to financial trade, existence of equilibrium requires agents with prior beliefs that agree on zero-probability events, and, therefore, with asymptotically homogeneous...