This paper analyzes the conditions under which a financial institution is systemically important. Measuring the level of systemic importance of financial institutions, we find that size is a leading determinant confirming the usual 'Too Big To Fail' argument. Nevertheless, the relation is...

Rules and regulations may have different impacts on risk-taking by individual banks and on banks' systemic risk levels. That is why implementing prudential rules and policies requires careful consideration of their impact on bank risk and systemic risk. This chapter assesses whether market-based...

This paper shows that a rate hike has countervailing effects on banks' risk appetite. It reduces risk when the debt burden of the banking sector is modest. We model a regulator whose trade-off between bank risk and credit supply is derived from a welfare function. We show that the regulator...

Drawdowns on credit commitments by firms reduce a bank's regulatory capital ratio. Using the Austrian Credit Register, we provide novel evidence that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, capital-constrained banks managed this concern by substantially cutting partly or fully unused credit...

The media influence our perception of reality and, since we act on those perceptions, reality is in turn affected by the media. News is a rich source of information, but, in addition, the sentiment (i.e., the tone of financial news) tells us how others perceive the financial system and how that...

The recent financial crisis has led to the introduction of contingent convertible instruments (CoCos) in the capital framework for banks. Although CoCos can provide benefits, such as automatic recapitalization of troubled banks, their inherent risks raise questions about whether they increase...

This paper investigates how countries' micro-prudential regulatory regimes are related to banks' systemic risk. We use a bank-level systemic risk indicator that can be decomposed into a bank's individual risk and its systemic linkage. To proxy the strictness of a country's regulatory regime, we...

In this study we disentangle two dimensions of banks' systemic risk: the level of bank tail risk and the linkage between a bank's tail risk and severe shocks in the financial system. We employ a measure of the systemic risk of financial institutions that can be decomposed into two subcomponents...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks’ macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. We develop a set of novel modeling mechanisms through which capital buffers can be allocated...