We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine under which circumstances a depositor-run at one bank may lead to a depositor-run at another bank. We implement two-person coordination games which capture the essence of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank-run model. Subjects in the roles of followers...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an...

This paper shows that a rate hike has countervailing effects on banks' risk appetite. It reduces risk when the debt burden of the banking sector is modest. We model a regulator whose trade-off between bank risk and credit supply is derived from a welfare function. We show that the regulator...

The Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a micro prudential instrument to strengthen the liquidity position of banks. However if in extreme scenarios the LCR becomes a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behaviour with the regulatory rule can have negative externalities. We simulate...

This paper investigates how countries' micro-prudential regulatory regimes are related to banks' systemic risk. We use a bank-level systemic risk indicator that can be decomposed into a bank's individual risk and its systemic linkage. To proxy the strictness of a country's regulatory regime, we...

Traditional theory suggests that high franchise value limits bank risk-taking incentives. Then why did many banks with exceptionally valuable franchises get exposed to new financial instruments, resulting in significant losses during the crisis? This paper attempts to reconcile theory and...

We study how contingent capital that converts in equity ahead of default affects bank risk-shifting. Going concern conversion restores equity value in highly levered states, thus reducing heightened risk incentives. In contrast, conversion at default for traditional bail-inable debt has no...

Rules and regulations may have different impacts on risk-taking by individual banks and on banks' systemic risk levels. That is why implementing prudential rules and policies requires careful consideration of their impact on bank risk and systemic risk. This chapter assesses whether market-based...

In this study we disentangle two dimensions of banks' systemic risk: the level of bank tail risk and the linkage between a bank's tail risk and severe shocks in the financial system. We employ a measure of the systemic risk of financial institutions that can be decomposed into two subcomponents...

We investigate the effects of the announcement and the disclosure of the clarification, methodology, and outcomes of the US banking stress tests on banks' equity prices, credit risk, systematic risk, and systemic risk during the 2009-13 period. We find only weak evidence that stress tests after...