This study investigates whether banks and insurance corporations perform regulatory arbitrage by buying bonds with inflated credit ratings. We argue that credit rating based capital requirements incentivize banks and insurance corporations to hold more bonds with inflated credit ratings. We...

We study consumers' attitudes towards sharing payments data with incumbent and new providers of payment and account information services, and using their services. This is important, in order to understand the possible impact of the revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2) on the functioning of...

Traditional theory suggests that high franchise value limits bank risk-taking incentives. Then why did many banks with exceptionally valuable franchises get exposed to new financial instruments, resulting in significant losses during the crisis? This paper attempts to reconcile theory and...

The paper investigates how the mix of credit risk measurement methodologies under Basel capital adequacy rules influenced banking stability in the Netherlands during 2008-2015. It presents a first descriptive analysis that helps to examine the micro-regulation of individual banks and the...

In the wake of the financial crisis, several countries are to ban commission payments to improve the quality of financial advice. This paper investigates the potential impact of commission bans on the source and quality of financial advice. To this end, we extend Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012)...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine under which circumstances a depositor-run at one bank may lead to a depositor-run at another bank. We implement two-person coordination games which capture the essence of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank-run model. Subjects in the roles of followers...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an...

This paper experimentally studies the impact of uncertainty about bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when stricter disclosure creates common knowledge about bank weakness. Borrowers are also less likely to...

This paper argues that a special bank bankruptcy regime is desirable for the efficient restructuring and/or liquidation of distressed banks. We first explore the principal features of corporate bankruptcy law. Next, we examine the specific characteristics that distinguish banks from other...

This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative merit of price versus quantity rules, showing how they target different incentives for risk creation. When banks differ in credit...