We provide experimental evidence to Binmore and Samuelson’s (1999) insights for modeling the learning process through which equilibrium is selected. They proposed the concept of drift to describe the effect of perturbations on the dynamic process leading to equilibrium in evolutionary games...

From a given directed weighted network of knowledge links between technology fields, the paper develops a multisector dynamic model of incremental innovation and R&D activity in these fields. The model is focused on the equilibrium share distribution of these variables, which is proved to be...

This paper attempts at fixing some guide-posts on the relation between variety, consumption and growth, while abstracting from the well known effect that variety may exert on productivity, through specialization. A mechanism is first described, through which preference for variety expressed by...

This paper contributes to the knowledge-incentive based explanation of R&D networks. It argues that knowledge overlap and novelty are complementary inputs of any R&D alliance, and the complementarity coefficients depend on the incremental or radical nature of the research activity. The relation...

This paper argues that the acceptance of two recent methodological advances in economics, namely game theory and laboratory experimentation, was affected by the history dependence constraining the formalization of economics. After an early period in which the two methods were coolly received by...

This paper reports on a laboratory study that examined the influence of experimenter bias in the investment game. Specifically we explored the effect of changing the gender of the experimenter and compared it with the double blind treatment. Our findings show that the presence of a female...

This paper analyses the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In his work, Harsanyi (1956) draws Nash’s solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930). Whereas Schelling (1960) proposes a multi-faceted...

In this paper we analyze the effect of different legislature and constituency size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. In turn,...