We study how contingent capital affects banks' risk choices. When triggered in highly levered states, going-concern conversion reduces risk-taking incentives, unlike conversion at default by traditional bail-inable debt. Interestingly, contingent capital (CoCo) may be less risky than bail-inable...

This paper deals with stress tests for credit risk and shows how exploiting the discretion when setting up and implementing a model can drive the results of a quantitative stress test for default probabilities. For this purpose, we employ several variations of a CreditPortfolioView-style model...

This paper presents a framework for estimating losses in the residential real estate mortgage portfolios of German banks. We develop an EL model where LGD estimates are based on current collateral values and PD dynamics are estimated using a structural PVAR approach. We confirm empirically that...

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is...

This paper proposes a quantitative multi-sector DSGE model with bank failure and firm default to study the interactions between bank regulation and climate policy. Households value the liquidity of deposits, which are protected by deposit insurance. Banks collect deposits and issue equity to...

This paper shows that firm credit constraints impair climate policy. Empirically, firms with tighter credit constraints, measured by their distanceto-default, exhibit a relatively smaller emission reduction after a carbon tax increase. We incorporate this channel into a quantitative DSGE model...

Multi-agency financial stability committees (FSCs) have grown dramatically since the global financial crisis. However, most cannot direct actions or recommend to other agencies that they take actions, and most would influence policy actions only through convening and discussing risks. We...

This paper tests whether an increase or decrease of the capital surcharge for being a global systemically important bank (G-SIB) envisaged by regulators has an impact on the CDS prices of these banks. We find evidence that the CDS spreads of a G-SIB bank increase (decrease) after the...

We introduce a novel simulation-based network approach, which provides full-edged distributions of potential interbank losses. Based on those distributions we propose measures for (i) systemic importance of single banks, (ii) vulnerability of single banks, and (iii) vulnerability of the whole...

Regulation needs effective supervision; but regulated entities may deviate with unobserved actions. For identification, we analyze banks, exploiting ECB's asset-quality-review (AQR) and supervisory security and credit registers. After AQR announcement, reviewed banks reduce riskier securities...