We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon...

A technique to determine closed-loop Nash equilibria of n-player differential games is developed when their dynamic state-control system is composed of decoupled ODEs. In particular, the theory of Lie point symmetries is exploited to achieve first integrals of such systems.

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding...

We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications,...

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs - up to level li - about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our...