Two firms, each consisting of a team with the owner and just oneemployee, compete on the labor market with free labor mobility. Afterobserving the investment decisions by firm owners their employees canengage in costly training, thus increasing their general and firm-specificproductivity, which...

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensityis endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensityand consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined bythe maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

To explain potential sources of wage rigidity this article analyzes a model of reciprocalkindness applied to a repeated ultimatum game with changing and nonzeroconflict payoffs. The model is also tested in a laboratory experiment. The resultsare compatible with the rentsharingapproach to wage...

Each of several exchange partners is the monopoly owner of a specific commoditywhich she can share with others. It is optimal to keep the own endowment, but allwould gain by mutual gift exchange. Participants play the game repeatedly in constantgroups (partner design) and can establish stable...

We examine the degree of trust and reciprocity in an experimental trust game with 662 participants from six different age groups, ranging from 8 year old primary school children to retired persons in their late sixties. Although both trust and reciprocity have been identified as fundamental...

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information andexpectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment,only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our resultsshow that average payback...

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games such as the prisoners' dilemma. In our experiment participants can increase efficiency by gift giving. In the one-sided...

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result my depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel...

Economists usually treat human behavior as being determined by the shadow of the future, while most other social scientists point to the shadow of the past. This paper considers experimental evidence relevant to the controversy and tries to reconcile both explanations of human behavior with each...