Economic intuitions concerning rational behaviour in interactive social situations are shaped byidealized models which are regarded as “approximately true”. But ideal models cannot be meaningfullydeemed approximately true unless asymptotically convergent processes imply them as limit cases....

Subjective payoffs that represent given preferences “all things considered” together withstrictly uncommitted opportunity taking cannot account for the behavior of personal actors. It is shown how agent basedapproaches can explicitly capture internal commitments of persons while sticking to...

Two traditional assumptions in neo-classical economics have beenmaterial self-interest and (commonly known) decision rationality. Sincethere is ample contradictory empirical evidence, many recent attemptshave been made to remodel the situation so that rational behavior ismore in line with actual...

Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past...

This paper examines finite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic ("price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations willtypically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionarymodel beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive be-havior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategicsubstitutes and complements and...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilized to analyze games by their "game-like"...

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations of "optimality" rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming zero-intelligence and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for...

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunitiesand adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior,but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only.This can justify intrinsic...