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Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests

Mago, Shakun; Samak, Anya; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in …. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not … improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259314

Recognizing Contributors: An Experiment on Public Goods

Samek, Anya; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112683

Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This article experimentally studies a two-stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one-stage contest. Contrary to the theory, the two-stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one-stage contest. There is significant over-dissipation in both stages of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258638

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259038

Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

A contest is a situation in which individuals or groups expend costly resources while competing to win a specific prize. The variety of economic situations that can be described as contests has attracted enormous attention from economic theorists. Despite the extensive theoretical research of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259262

Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum

Mago, Shakun; Sheremeta, Roman; Yates, Andrew - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259589

Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

exceed theoretical predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259661

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

McCarter, Matthew; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

A common finding in social sciences is that member change hinders group functioning and performance. However, questions remain as to why member change negatively affects group performance and what are some ways to alleviate the negative effects of member change on performance? To answer these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259957

Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict

Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260731

When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents

Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman; Shields, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260837