The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what … one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after … bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would be self-enforcing, i.e., require no commitment power. Insteadof …

. Experimental provision of return and cost information significantly increases educational aspirations. However, it does not close … the aspiration gap as university graduates respond even more strongly to the information treatment. Persistent effects in … a follow-up survey indicate that participants indeed process and remember the information. Differences in economic …

To study how information about educational inequality affects public concerns and policy preferences, we devise survey … experiments in representative samples of the German population. Providing information about the extent of educational inequality … strong positive information treatment effect, which is increased further by informing about policy effectiveness. …

about the university earnings premium. To test whether public support for tuition depends on earnings information, we devise … opposing tuition. Providing information on the university earnings premium raises support for tuition by 7 percentage points …, turning the plurality in favor. The opposition-reducing effect persists two weeks after treatment. Information on fiscal costs …

Public preferences for charging tuition are important for determining higher education finance. To test whether public … support for tuition depends on information and design, we devise several survey experiments in representative samples of the … German electorate (N>19,500). The electorate is divided, with a slight plurality opposing tuition. Providing information on …

, implying endogeneity of policy preferences. The information treatment also affects non-partisan swing voters. …