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The Blues Goes On But When Does It Stop?- Public Goods Experiments with Non-Denite andNon-Commonly Known Time Horizons

Gonzalez, Luis G.; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

experiment compares punctual to interval information about the number of repetitions, whereby interval information can be … contribution levels do not change signicantly across treatments, asymmetric information about the time horizon reduces the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866812

Is Satisficing Absorbable?An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We experimentally investigate whether the satisficing approach isabsorbable, i.e., whether it still applies after participants become awareof it. In a setting where an investor decides between a riskless bondand either one or two risky assets, we familiarize participants with thesatisficing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866714

Tax Morale and (De-)Centralization- An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sausgruber, Rupert - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them pro-vides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries.In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a regionare spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866975

Leading by example with and without exclusionpower in voluntary contribution experiments

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group membercontribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contributionmechanism,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866642

Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirationsexpressing how much they want to earn given their expectationsabout the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficingsales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspiration profiles. In afirst...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866647

Voluntary contributions with imperfect information:An experimental study

Fiore, Annamaria; Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of … several risky prospects are elicited via a second-price auction. We find that limited information about the productivity of … the public good lowers significantly initial contributions in comparison to a setting with perfect information, whereas …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650

On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness:An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Levati, M. Vittoria; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almostexclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by materialincentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthy and to punishuntrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivatedplayers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866698

Leadership and cooperation in public goodsexperiments

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. Weexamine the effects of leadership on contributions in public goods experiments.Leadership by example is implemented by letting one groupmember contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866773

Does Ignorance of Economic Returns and Costs Explain the Educational Aspiration Gap? Evidence From Representative Survey Experiments

Lergetporer, Philipp; Werner, Katharina; Woessmann, Ludger - 2018

. Experimental provision of return and cost information significantly increases educational aspirations. However, it does not close … the aspiration gap as university graduates respond even more strongly to the information treatment. Persistent effects in … a follow-up survey indicate that participants indeed process and remember the information. Differences in economic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932956

Educational Inequality and Public Policy Preferences: Evidence From Representative Survey Experiments

Lergetporer, Philipp; Werner, Katharina; Woessmann, Ludger - 2018

To study how information about educational inequality affects public concerns and policy preferences, we devise survey … experiments in representative samples of the German population. Providing information about the extent of educational inequality … strong positive information treatment effect, which is increased further by informing about policy effectiveness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932975