We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of several risky prospects are elicited via a...

Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972)and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether atheory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria accordingto the assumptions on which they are based,...

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experimentsin which followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ actions or else observe nothing. Ourexperiments show that consistent with the theory, leaders enjoy a greater first-mover advantagewhen followers...