My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a standard rational agent"? In earlier work, GulPesendorfer [2001] use...

We study the dynamics of growth and investment in a continuous time model with vintage capital. Vintage capital models may be characterized by non-exponential rates of depreciation and technical change and can incorporate "gestation lags" as well as "learning by doing". We investigate the effect...

An independent private values model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is chosen to equate revealed demand and supply. In ever symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader does not act as a price-taker, but instead strategically misrepresents his true...

We study a class of two-player continuous time stochastic games in which agents can make (costly) discrete or discontinuous changes in the variables that affect their payoffs. It is shown that in these games there are Markov perfect equilibria of the two-sided (s,S) rule type. In such equilibria...

In this paper we study the relationship between wealth, income distribution and growth in a game-theoretic context in which property rights are not completely enforceable. We consider equilibrium paths of accumulation which yield players utilities that are at least as high as those that they...

In this paper we study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses both models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable...

An independent private values model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which a double auction sets price to equate revealed demand and supply. In a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader acts not as a price-taker, but instead strategically misrepresents his true...

This paper studies the problem of a monopoly who is uncertain about the demand it faces and learns about it over time through its pricing experience. The demand curve facing the monopoly is not constant--it changes over time in how it differs from an informed monopoly's policy. It turns out...