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Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266313
Weitzman's search model requires that, conditional on stopping, the agent only takes boxes which have already been inspected. We relax this assumption and allow the agent to take any uninspected box without inspecting its contents when stopping. Thus, each uninspected box is now a potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352859
The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141864
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878920
We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education à la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non-contractible. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012653511
In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866695
work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they … also allow for variations in incentives in one work period, in order to analyze spillover effects to the work periods … experimental data. A short-term increase in incentives in one period should lead to higher effort in that period, and, due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985278
Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives … bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward … minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932936
Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467777
incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we … investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on … those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467847