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Forges, Françoise; Horst, Ulrich - 2017

We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663463

Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent

Celentani, Marco - 1993

We analyze in a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient opponent, player 2. We assume that Player 1's type is private information and that players do not directly observe each other's action but rather see an imperfect signal of it. We show that in any Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235888

Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments

Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Rincke, Johannes; … - 2023

sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do … not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467780

Contracting over commitment vs. flexibility under asymmetric information

Galperti, Simone - 2011

We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers …. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs … of the induced balance between commitment and flexibility. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282919

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - 2011

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286976

TIME CONSISTENCY AND INVESTMENTINCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Dijkstra, Bouwe R. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2002

output as well as the tax rate are increasingin investment. With divisible investment, commitment always leads to the first … underinvestment with taxation. With indivisible investmentand direct regulation, commitment leads to the first best. With taxation … however,commitment may not lead to the first best and time consistency can lead to higherwelfare. This remarkable result …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868929