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Leading by example with and without exclusionpower in voluntary contribution experiments
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group membercontribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contributionmechanism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866642
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An Application of the English Clock MarketMechanism to Public Goods Games
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2001
We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are notsubmitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individualspress a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This publicgoods institution exploits the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867325
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Voluntary contributions with imperfect information:An experimental study
Fiore, Annamaria; Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of several risky prospects are elicited via a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650
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Leadership and cooperation in public goodsexperiments
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004
in public goods experiments.Leadership by example is implemented by letting one groupmember contribute to the public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866773
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The Blues Goes On But When Does It Stop?- Public Goods Experiments with Non-Denite andNon-Commonly Known Time Horizons
Gonzalez, Luis G.; Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004
A robust nding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initialcontribution rates sharply decline towards the … end. This paper reports onan exploratory experiment designed to discover whether such a decline is simply triggered by the … experiment compares punctual to interval information about the number of repetitions, whereby interval information can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866812
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Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time¤- An Experimental Study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324
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Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision
Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanismsin the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want tocontribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendumunder full information about all contributions. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866711
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Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation- An Evolutionary Approach -
Levati, Maria Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
contribution phenomenon oftenobserved in public goods experiments and in real life. Formally, conditionalcooperation is captured by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867002
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Tax Morale and (De-)Centralization- An Experimental Study
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Sausgruber, Rupert - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003
population size of eachregion. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower taxmorale and less efficient outcomes. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866975
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Rebate Rules in Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Introducing the Bid-Cap Rule
Gerstmeier, Fabian; Oezcelik, Yigit; Tolksdorf, Michel - 2023
induces weakly less variance in payments compared with the proportional rebate rule. In our experiment, we find that both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467759