In general, the result of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on order. We define nice weak dominance. Under nice weak dominance, order does not matter. We identify an important class of games under which nice weak dominance and weak dominance are equivalent, and so order...

This paper uses results of lattice theory, convex analysis, and nonsmooth analysis to establish conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when payoff functions are continuous but not quasi-concave. A class of economic games for which this theory is important is given.

We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to a project that generates a flow of public benefits. Examples include fund drives for public television or university buildings. The games we study have complete information about payoffs, allow each player to contribute each period, and let...

We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a fixed cot of trading across periods, and their decisions of whether or not to trade in the...