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Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - 2008
under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266288
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Ranking friends
Kets, Willemien; Feinberg, Yossi - 2012
We investigate the scope for cooperation within a community engaged in repeated reciprocal interactions. Players seek the help of others and approach them sequentially according to some fixed order, that is, a ranking profile. We study the ranking profiles that are most effective in sustaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352860
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Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games of incomplete information
Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran - 2013
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352862
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Renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard and persistent private information
Strulovici, Bruno - 2011
How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and … weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has … exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single sensitivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282880
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A cooperative value for Bayesian games
Kalai, Adam; Kalai, Ehud - 2010
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286981
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
Matthews, Steven A. - 1993
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation … may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the … contract must be a sales contract if the principal's renegotiation position will be inherently inferior in the sense that (a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235864
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Optimal dynamic auctions
Pai, Mallesh; Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2008
We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276989
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Equilibria existence in regular discontinuous games
de Castro, Luciano I. - 2008
Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re-quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con-dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282886
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An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion
Sandholm, William H. - 1997
Using techniques from evolutionary game theory, we analyze potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games which includes a general model of network congestion as a special case. We concisely characterize both the complete set of Nash equilibria and the set of equilibria which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236010
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Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József - 2022
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013333575