This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion...

When making collektive desicions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be...

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo...

This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient...

In this paper the authors measure the risk attitudes of bond investors which can be revealed from settled market prices. They present an equilibrium model which focuses on the stochastic behavior of tastes in addition to the dynamics of investor beliefs.

In a three-period finite competitive exchange economy with incomplete financial markets and retrading, we study the possibility of controlling asset price volatility through financial innovation. We first give sufficient conditions on preferences and endowments implying that whatever is the...

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...

This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria foralternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicativecriteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria toobtain new justications of known social...

This paper provides empirical evidence on the aggregation of information in committees. We analyze unique data from the decision-making process of hiring committees within a large private company. In the hiring process, committee members first conduct independent one-to-one interviews and give...

For many people "solidarity" has become a meaningless word used in slogans - too often used without leading to any economic consequences. We show in this paper conditions under which solidarity can be a powerful instrument. In a solidary action, an individual in a group contributes to a series...