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Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2022
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197543
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School choice and loss aversion
Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2019
Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290339
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Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023
Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467863
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How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field
Basteck, Christian; Klaus, Bettina; Kübler, Dorothea - 2018
The use of lotteries is advocated to desegregate schools. We study lottery quotas embedded in the two most common school choice mechanisms, namely deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms. Some seats are allocated based on merit (e.g., grades) and some based on lottery draws. We focus on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932979
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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness
Meisner, Vincent - 2021
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012653514
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Competitive equilibria in decentralized matching with incomplete information
Atakan, Alp E. - 2007
This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266300
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Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József - 2022
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it … creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013333575
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Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets
Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023
paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467722
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Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József - 2022
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it … creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467786
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Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets
Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023
Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467870