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voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266322
Promise competition is prevalent in many economic environments, but promise keeping is often difficult to observe. We study the value of transparency for promise competition and ask whether promises still offer an opportunity to honor future obligations when outcomes do not allow for observing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467742
-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects for the Boston mechanism or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290353
the launch of the project. Examples are the Kyoto protocol, voting with different weights (shareholders, the UN with the … contributions is a Pareto-improvement to every original threshold. The contribution probabilities of some player types defined by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332908
Under simple majority voting an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to minorities. It is … the purpose of sub- and super-majority rules to protect legitimate minority interests. We study how voting rules are … choose voting rules for given distributions of gains and losses that can arise from a policy, but before learning their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467846
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contributionexperiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group membercontribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadershipincreases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contributionmechanism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866642
We use a two-person linear voluntary contribution mechanism with stochastic marginal benefits from the public good to examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of several risky prospects are elicited via a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650
in public goods experiments.Leadership by example is implemented by letting one groupmember contribute to the public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866773
A robust nding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initialcontribution rates sharply decline towards the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866812
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324