Showing 1 - 10 of 189
optimal screening mechanism and characterize its distortions. We analyze the inefficiency of the monopolist's offers in terms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282919
How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and … weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has … exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single sensitivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282880
We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290369
Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischen dem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und dem Kreditnehmer die Möglichkeit der Bildung einer zu Lasten des Kreditkäufers gehenden vertikalen Kollusion besteht. Die Bank übernimmt nach der Veräußerung des Kredits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427759
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663451
inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932912
are more pronounced for a fancy than a standard design, it is optimal to fix the standard design ex ante. If renegotiation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932921
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation … may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the … contract must be a sales contract if the principal's renegotiation position will be inherently inferior in the sense that (a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235864
Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303781
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878920