Real world players often increase their payoþs by voluntarily committing to play a .xed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further bene.t from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional...

Under the rational expectation s assumption of Muth, economic agents use their perfect knowledge of the distribution of future prices to compute optimal current actions. In private forecasts equilibrium, intorduced here, agents use subjective in accurate forecasts about future prices to compute...

Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash...

We show that any correlation device with rational coefficients can be generated by a mechanism where each player sends a private message to a mediator who in turn makes a public deterministic announcement. Moreover, the mechanism suggested is immunized against individual deviations.

We deal with the concept of e-consistent equilibrium which corresponds to strategies inducing an e-equilbrium in any subgame reached along the play path. Examples and existence conditions are given.