Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...

This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...

Global games of regime change that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...

Bargaining is examined for the situation in which each party has private information regarding their valuation of the good as well as the value of the good to the other party. The k-double auction and the first-and-final offer bargaining game are shown not to be ex ante incentive efficient. This...

This paper presents novel evidence for the prevalence of deviations from rational behavior in human decision making - and for the corresponding causes and consequences. The analysis is based on move-by-move data from chess tournaments and an identification strategy that compares behavior of...

This paper presents an empirical investigation of the relation between decision speed and decision quality for a real-world setting of cognitively-demanding decisions in which the timing of decisions is endogenous: professional chess. Move-by-move data provide exceptionally detailed and precise...

Global games of regime change-coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it-have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the...

This paper presents a novel approach to analyze human decision-making that involves comparing the behavior of professional chess players relative to a computational benchmark of cognitively bounded rationality. This benchmark is constructed using algorithms of modern chess engines and allows...

Several division rules have been proposed in the literature regarding how anarbiter should divide a bankrupt estate. Different rules satisfy different sets ofaxioms, but all rules satisfy claims boundedness which requires that no contributorbe given more than her initial contribution. This paper...