Showing 1 - 10 of 44
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277
settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932892
procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under … the optimal scoring auction each supplier proposes the standard design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932921
cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467730
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862
continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816
Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012
We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352857
Despite their importance, games with incomplete information and dependent types are poorly understood; only special cases have been considered and a general approach is not yet available. In this paper, we propose a new condition (named richness) for correlation of types in (asymmetric) Bayesian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352858
Overbidding in auctions has been attributed to e.g. risk aversion, loser regret, level-k, and cursedness, relying on varying identifying assumptions. I argue that \"type projection\'\" organizes these findings and largely captures observed behavior. Type projection formally models that people...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932901