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Framing Effects, Selective Information andMarket Behavior An Experimental Analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816

Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin G. - 2022

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467730

Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862

Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277

Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017

settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932892

Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2017

procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under … the optimal scoring auction each supplier proposes the standard design. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932921

Privately Contributing to Public Goods over Time¤- An Experimental Study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participantscan vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing apublic good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contributiongradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867324

An Application of the English Clock MarketMechanism to Public Goods Games

Levati, Maria Vittoria; Neugebauer, Tibor - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2001

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are notsubmitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individualspress a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This publicgoods institution exploits the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867325

Paintings and Numbers : An Econometric Investigation of Sales Rates, Prices and Returns in Latin American Art Auctions

Campos, Nauro F.; Barbosa, Renata Leite - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2008

This paper uses a unique data set of Latin American paintings auctioned by Sotheby's between 1995 and 2002 to investigate several puzzles from the recent auctions literature. Our results suggest that: (1) the reputation of an artist and the provenance of the artwork, omitted variables in most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860085