Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...

Global games of regime change that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...

Global games of regime change-coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it-have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the...

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...

We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is...

For the Euro 2000 Soccer Championships an experimental asset market was conducted, with traders buying and selling contracts on the winners of individual matches. Market-generated probabilites are compared to professional bet quotas, and factors that are responsible for the quality of the market...

This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the...

Bargaining is examined for the situation in which each party has private information regarding their valuation of the good as well as the value of the good to the other party. The k-double auction and the first-and-final offer bargaining game are shown not to be ex ante incentive efficient. This...

This paper presents novel evidence for the prevalence of deviations from rational behavior in human decision making - and for the corresponding causes and consequences. The analysis is based on move-by-move data from chess tournaments and an identification strategy that compares behavior of...