Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

We solve and test experimentally a global-games model of speculative attacks where agents can choose whether to read, at a cost, a payoff irrelevant (sunspot) announcement. Assuming that subjects exogenously believe some others to follow sunspots, we provide conditions for a unique equilibrium...

The common prior assumption asserts that the beliefs of agents in different states of theworld are their posteriors based on a common prior and possibly some private signal. Commonpriors are pervasive in most economic models of incomplete information, oligopoly models withasymmetrically informed...

Over the last few years, worldwide mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have increasedsharply both in terms of value and volume. This development has not only beendriven by corporate acquirers but also to an increasing extent by private equityinvestors. In this paper, we analyze differences in...

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute a disruption to the workingenvironment of the inventive labor force of the acquired company. If inventors wouldrespond with a decline of their patent productivity or departure from the firm thiscan be detrimental to the innovative process within the...

It has been widely suggested that since the early 1980s many diversified firms narrowed the scopeof their activities by refocusing on their core businesses, primarily through divestment activity.This study examines the extent and determinants of divestment across a large sample of UK firmsover...

In diesem Aufsatz untersuchen wir das Wachstum der Vorstandsvergütung in den vergangenen 15 Jahren und stellen uns die Frage, wie sich die Vorstandsvergütung in der Zukunft entwickeln könnte. Wir vermuten, dass die Einführung von Long-Term-Incentives (LTI) in Form von Aktienoptionsplänen,...

Investors and academics increasingly criticize that features of employee stock option (ESO) programs reflect rent-extraction by managers (managerial power view). The authors use a unique European dataset to investigate the relationship between the design of ESO programs and corporate governance...

This note analyses investment and risk-taking in a simple agency model of public regulation/procurement borrowed from Laffont & Tirole (1993). We show that the principal will overinvest or underinvest depending on whether investment is marginally more productive in bad or in good states. Due to...

We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...