We consider an infinite dynamic game played by one large player and a large number of small players. State variables are allowed, and public histories include only the play of the large player, the aggregate play of the small players and the aggregate state variable. We use a reputational...

In this note we show that even if after default a sovereign can make deposits on a Swiss bank account, the exclusion from future debt is sufficient to deter a patient country from default. In contrast to the work by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we assume that there is a fixed set of standard assets...

We examine the following paradox: In a dynamic setting, an arbitrarily large finite number of agents adn a continuum of agents can lead to radically different equilibrium outcomes. We show that in a simple strategic setting this paradox is a general phenomenon. We also show that the paradox...

A model of fashion cycles is developed in which fashion is used as a signalling device in a "dating-game". We assume that there is a designer (monopolist) who can create new designs at a positive fixed cost and zero marginal cost. Designs are durable commodities. We show the existence of...

We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. Each voter has noisy private information about the state variable. We show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private...

We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k+1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibirum of...

We analyze a model of a two-candidate election in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Voters may costlessly choose to either vote for one of the candidates or abstain. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and, nevertheless,...