Showing 1 - 10 of 164
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277
settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932892
procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under … the optimal scoring auction each supplier proposes the standard design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932921
This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266265
This paper illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266287
continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816
Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012
bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are … minimal necessary increment aþects the outcome of the auction. We also study the impact of budget caps on total bids. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266326
We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352857