Showing 1 - 7 of 7
’Nothing in business excites so much interest in the wider world as the pay of top executives.’ theEconomist wrote in a 2003 article titled ’Fat cats feeding - Executive pay’. Indeed, it seems thatthe dwindling heights to which CEO compensation has risen trigger stronger feelings than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870771
Governments often provide their citizens with goods and services that are also supplied in markets: education, housing, nutritional assistance, etc. We analyze the political economy of the public provision of private goods when individuals care about their social image. We show that image...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592129
This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals have relative consumption concerns. By providing private goods, governments directly intervene in the consumption structure, and thereby have an instrument...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663462
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932977
We repeatedly elicit beliefs about the returns to study effort in a panel survey of students of a large university course. A behavioral model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and malleable beliefs yields the prediction that the dynamics of return beliefs mirrors the importance of exerting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932988
We study preferences over procedures in the presence of naive agents. We employ a school choice setting following Pathak and Sönmez (2008) who show that sophisticated agents are better off under the Boston mechanism than under a strategy-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290353
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467804