Showing 1 - 10 of 92
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326342
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation.It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outsidegroup deviation options.This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091220
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ? …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133
different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268490
coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game<br/>has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient … condition for a sequencing<br/>game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time<br/>algorithm to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144428