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Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke; Musegaas, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2015

different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268490

Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games

Borm, Peter; Ciftci, B.B.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path.A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player's payoff does not decrease as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091740

A Stroll with Alexia

Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke; Lohmann, E.R.M.A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007

This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092221