Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing arrangements such as credit registers and bureaus will lead to lower investment in acquiring information. However, banks base their decisions on...

The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration.These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers.We show that these deregulations may be...

Credit contracts are non-exclusive. A string of theoretical papers shows that nonexclusivity generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how the contractual externality stemming from the non-exclusivity of credit contracts affects credit...

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry.We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information.By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market.Disclosure...

We provide a modeling framework to think about selective contracting in the health care sector. Two health care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal...

Abstract: This paper considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and competitive framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. In this way we extend the main bulk of the real options theory where the capacity level is given. We...

In this paper we analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of RJVs.We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function of R&D activities.Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that R&D projects...

Abstract: We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and...