In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...

The aim of the present study is to construct a state feedback controller for a given linear system that minimizes the worst-case effect of an L2 -bounded disturbance. Our setting is different from the usual framework of H -theory in that we consider nonzero initial conditions. The situation is...

Random matching models with different states are an important class of dynamic games; for example, money search models, job search models, and some games in biology are special cases.In this paper, we investigate the basic structure of the models: the existence of equilibria, the global...

In this paper we consider the discounted linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have an index larger than one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash (OLN) equilibrium. In a small macro-economic stabilization game we...

This paper analyzes some pros and cons of a monetary union for the ASEAN1 countries, excluding Myanmar. We estimate a stylized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model for the ASEAN countries. Using the framework of linear quadratic differential games, we contrast the potential gains or...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and...

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of...

In this note we reconsider the indefinite open-loop Nash linear quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon.In particular we derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which the game will have a unique equilibrium.