We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study...

This paper formalizes the difference between firms, nonprofits, and cooperatives and identifies optimal organizational choice. In a model of quality provision, we find a clear ranking of quality produced: Firms provide lowest and nonprofits highest levels of quality. Efficiency, however, depends...

This paper offers an explanation of rationally incomplete contracts where incompleteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient. This happens through costly...

We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation.Both arrangements are...

This paper generalizes Porter’s notion of the value chain for the analysis of service industries. The generalization entails that the flow and the physical transformation and assembly of goods that are characteristic of manufacturing are generalized into flows and transformation of data and...

This chapter reviews some key points in the analysis of trust, based on Nooteboom (2002)i.The following questions are addressed.What can we have trust in?What is the relation between trust and control?What are the sources of trust? And what are its limits?By what process is trust built up and...